Drjones. BMJ 1993; 306:1459-61 A 16 year old boy with diabetes lies in hospital refusing the necessary treatment required to save his arm. Septicaemia is likely to result, which might threaten his life. Though the primary efforts will naturally be targeted towards discussion with the young person with the aim of overcoming all of the underlying issues that seem to be preventing him Every case will have its own unique features, but in this article we search for the presence of pointers and themes in recent case law and provide a medicoethical commentary on the present state of the law. We also examine the implications ofthe cases for practitioners.
The Children Act 1989 came into force on 14 October 1991, bringing the law relating to children and families into one piece of legislation.' In seeking to redefine the balance between securing children's safety and the responsibility and rights of parents to bring up children within their own families, the act adopts as its guiding principle the welfare ofthe child.
One aspect of the importance of the child's welfare is the act's concern that children's wishes and feelings are incorporated into decision making. Indeed, the act's welfare checklist has as its first item "the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child considered in the light of his age and understanding." The act has incorporated the Gillick principle that the child's full consent to examination, assessment, or treatment is required under the various protection, supervision, and care orders ifhe or she is "of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision. Re R concerned a 15 year old girl who had voluntarily entered the care of the local authority after a fight with her father.5 R had been known to social services for 12 years as a possible victim of emotional abuse. After leaving care she absconded from her parents' home, damaged property, threatened suicide, and attacked her father. R was admitted to the psychiatric unit of a hospital and then to a specialist adolescent care unit. The unit sought to give her antipsychotic drugs. The local authority initially gave permission for the administration but withdrew the consent on the basis that they thought R was competent to express her own wishes on the subject. 
to consent to medical treatment for their child. It followed that a competent child could never veto treatment if his or her parents had consented to it. The court was not persuaded by the fact that in other orders under the Children Act neither the court nor the parents could override the expressed wishes of a competent child to refuse assessment or treatment. Only one member of the appeal court (Lord Justice Nolan) was willing to hold that the welfare checklist from section 1(3) of the Children Act should guide the court's deliberations when exercising its inherent jurisdiction.
All members of the Court of Appeal held that the court's inherent jurisdiction had to be exercised in the best interests of the child. As the child got older, the court held, greater weight should be accorded to his or her wishes. In this sense the court in Re W made a concession to the Gillick principle.
We now comment on the court's rulings from the perspective ofmedicine, ethics, and the law.
Discussion
The cases of Re R and Re W adopt a different view of the Gillick case from that found in the Children Act generally. Some might argue that these cases merely codify common sense, '4 but we think that they contradict the spirit of the Children Act. In so doing they implicitly set a higher "tariff" for refusing a medical examination or procedure than for consenting to one. A similar approach can be detected in the recent Court of Appeal decision in Re T. In that case the court held that a 20 year old's refusal of a blood transfusion was not valid because she was misinformed about possible substitutes for blood and did not foresee that her life was in danger. If T had made the decision to accept treatment on an equally misinformed basis, however, perhaps her consent to treatment would not have been called into question.
It seems obvious that a right to give consent must also mean the right to refuse consent. Otherwise the right to consent would seem to be no more than the right to agree with the medical practitioner. Many medical ethicists have commented wryly on the catch 22 by which patients whose competence is in doubt will be found rational if they accept the doctor's proposal but incompetent if they reject professional advice."-"8 Others argue that refusal of treatment should trigger an inquiry about the patient's competence, though not necessarily a finding of incompetence.'9 As treatment is perceived to be in the patient's best interests they argue that we should impose a higher tariff for refusing than consenting because refusing would seem to the ethicists to be contrary to good sense. This assumes two debatable points: that the doctor is right about what is in the patient's best interests and that treating the patient even without the patient's consent will still help the patient. Although W accepted treatment after the court's decision, overriding her autonomy might well -have harmed her as her main desire for most ofthe case seemed to have been to exert control. As was pointed out by the court, control is the essence ofthe struggle in cases of anorexia." Long term follow up studies of people with anorexia are salutary reminders of the lifelong struggles for control in a considerable minority, which follow initial intervention in adolescence.2' Hence there is at least room for debate concerning the clinical decision to override a youngster's expressed consent through such forcible means as a court of law. Naturally, in some cases the court option will be the only one available without risking the life of the young person, but in lesser cases there will be increasing room for debate on this question.
In conclusion, practitioners are advised to proceed cautiously in treating children and young people whose consent is in doubt. Given 
